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ABSTRACT 
 
We review the enforcement of competition policy and the activities of Turkish Competition 
Authority during 1997-2000.  Descriptive statistics are provided on the caseload handled, such 
as types of anti-competitive behavior investigated, breakdown of investigations by industry, 
violations found, and penalties imposed.  Competition Authority has been stretched in terms of 
manpower as it has faced a flood of applications in addition to having to develop the necessary 
secondary legislation.  The most salient cases handled concerned infringement of competition, 
while a rather lenient position was taken in authorizing mergers and acquisitions.  The silence of 
the Turkish Competition Law regarding public undertakings is a potential source of problem for 
aligning competition policies with those of EU. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to review the implementation of Turkish Competition Law during 
the relatively short period of time that has passed since its enactment in December 1994.1 The 
paper will focus on the activities of Turkish Competition Authority, drawing upon its annual 
reports and interviews with its staff. 
Competition Board, the decision making organ of Competition Authority which is responsible 
for the enforcement of Competition Law, was not appointed until February 1997 and finally began 
its operations in November 1997.  The enactment of the law and the establishment of Competition 
Authority have largely been due to Turkey's obligation under the Association Agreement between 
Turkey and the European Economic Community, the European Union (EU) as formerly called, to 
enact and implement a competition policy.2  The Association Agreement requires that the parties 
should apply the provisions of Rome Treaty for the harmonization of their laws, tax rules, and 
competition policies.  Pursuant to the agreement reached at the Association Council meeting of 
March 1995, Turkey and EU finally created a customs union starting January 1, 1996.3  This 
agreement required that Turkey undertook all necessary measures to enact and effectively 
implement the competition law and policies of EU.  Thus, enactment of Turkish Competition Law 
was a prelude on Turkey’s part to the signing of the customs union agreement with EU.  The lag 
between enactment of Competition Law and its enforcement is to a large extent a reflection of the 
                                                 
1 Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition, published in the Turkish Official Gazette No. 22140, dated 
December 13, 1994.  The English version of Law No. 4054 can be found at the official website of 
Competition Authority: http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/kanuneng.html (November 20, 2001). 
2 The Association Agreement was signed in Ankara on September 12, 1963 and became effective on 
December 1, 1964. 
3 Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council. 
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ambivalence on the part of both Turkey and EU regarding Turkey’s accession to EU and the stop-
and-go nature of the progress that has been made in that regard.4 
After a prolonged period of economic and political turmoil in the second half of 1970s, Turkey 
set on a course of market-oriented reforms at the end of 1979.  The military regime that seized 
power in 1980 at the height of the crisis continued with the reform program, which was a 
fundamental break with the country’s étatist past. Reform of the trade regime stood at the core of 
the reform program.  This involved commitment to a more flexible exchange rate policy and 
abandoning of import substitution policies through promotion of exports as well as liberalization of 
imports. Another main objective of the 1980 reform was to reduce the size of the public sector and 
to allow more freedom to private initiative and markets in determining resource allocation in the 
economy.  Privatization of state-owned enterprises and liberalization of financial markets were 
conceived as two very important aspects of this process.5 
The 1980 reforms brought about profound changes in the incentive structure economic actors 
faced and in the way they did business.  This was the case especially for the Turkish manufacturing 
industry, which had to go through a fundamental reorientation after decades of protection under 
import substitution policies.  Cushioned by import restrictions and high tariff barriers, many sectors 
of the manufacturing industry had been highly concentrated, and state-owned enterprises had 
dominated many important sectors.  Export promotion policies created a new set of incentives for 
the manufacturing industry, and the share of manufacturing in exports has dramatically increased 
within a rather short period of time.  One would have expected that more liberal import policies 
and export orientation of the 1980s would also transform the structure of the Turkish 
manufacturing industry.  However, the evidence available on the evolution of market concentration 
in Turkish manufacturing industries since 1980s point at the persistence of monopolization and 
                                                 
4 For a review of the progress of EU-Turkey relations, see EU Commission (2001). 
5 For reviews of Turkey’s liberalization policies, see Öniş and Riedel (1993), Togan (1994), and Togan and 
Balasubramanyam (1996). 
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high concentration in the Turkish manufacturing industry.6  High concentration ratios may say very 
little about the industry structure in an open economy as long as international competition limits 
any domestic power; however, there is no strong evidence that imports has played a disciplining 
role on the Turkish manufacturing industry.7 
Given the persistence of high concentration ratios in the manufacturing industry, the importance 
of instituting and implementing anti-trust mechanisms in Turkey become more apparent.  In 
addition, anti-trust policies would have reinforced the process of privatising state-owned firms, 
which started in 1986, as many of the enterprises involved were large, if not dominant.  The 
privatization experience of Turkey can be described at best as mediocre, as restructuring of most of 
the utility-like sectors, such as telecommunications and electricity, with large state-owned firms 
has not yet been accomplished.8 
It can be argued that Turkey's meagre performance in terms of restructuring its manufacturing 
industry and privatization largely draws from its failure to institute and implement an effective 
competition policy.  That improved performance in most of the sectors subject to liberalization and 
privatization will not come about without first instituting and implementing an effective 
competition policy was paid lip service in discussions, but largely ignored during development and 
enactment of legislation.  This has contributed to failure in building consensus regarding 
privatization and liberalization in various sectors and to wasting of considerable economic 
resources through ill-conceived and incongruous privatization and liberalization legislation.  A 
regulatory framework to oversee the industries that are likely to remain imperfectly competitive 
after privatization was not thought of before hand for most of the industries. 
                                                 
6 See Katırcıoğlu et al. (1995), Yalçın (2000), and Metin-Özcan et al. (2000). 
7 Levinsohn (1993) tests the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis using Turkish data for the 1983-1986 
period, and provides some weak evidence supporting the hypothesis for a small number of industries. 
8 For a detailed review of Turkey’s privatization experience between 1986 and 1998, see Karataş (2001). 
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The importance of instituting a regulatory framework prior to liberalization and privatization of 
industries has finally been realized and legislation has been passed to this effect in years 2000 and 
2001.  Though the liberalization of the capital account and full convertibility of the Turkish Lira 
took place 1989, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency was only established in 2000 to 
oversee the ailing banking industry.  Also in 2000, a new act to liberalize the telecommunications 
sector was enacted and a Telecommunications Board was established to regulate the industry.  
Finally, two different acts were enacted for the liberalization of electricity and natural gas 
industries in 2001, and an Energy Authority was established to oversee the performance of both of 
these industries. 
Had the competition policies been developed and implemented earlier, establishing and 
maintaining of competition in these very important sectors would have been much easier.  At the 
same time, without a clarification of how competition policy and regulatory framework that is 
being developed to oversee the operation of these industries will interact, enhanced economic 
performance in these industries is not likely to come about.  The relations between these newly 
founded bodies and the Turkish Competition Authority is going to be an important issue and might 
call for amendments in Competition Law in order to clarify possible conflicts of authority and 
prevent overlapping jurisdictions. 
This paper focuses on the activities of the Turkish Competition Authority, drawing upon its 
annual reports and interviews with its staff.  The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 
summarizes the main elements of Turkish Competition Law and discusses the structure of 
Competition Board and its enforcement powers.  Section 3 briefly describes the aspects of the 
Turkish manufacturing industry relevant for this study and reports data on the evolution of 
concentration ratios and import penetration in Turkish manufacturing industry in the post-1980 
period.  Section 4 analyses the caseload and activities of Competition Authority during 1997-2000 
and provides descriptive statistics on the industry incidence of investigations, the types of behavior 
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that were investigated, and violations that were found and penalties imposed.  Section 6 provides a 
discussion and some conclusions. 
 
2. Turkish Competition Law and the Powers of Competition Authority9 
2.1. Turkish Competition Law 
Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition constitutes the legal framework to protect and 
further competition in Turkey.  As mentioned above, although the law was enacted in December 
1994, Competition Board could only be appointed in February 1997, and Competition Authority 
finally started its operations in November 1997 after completing its organization.  Thus, the year 
2000 constituted the third operational year for Competition Authority. 
As per the requirements of customs union agreement with EU, Turkish Competition Law is to a 
large extent an adoptation of the EU competition law.  Turkish Competition Law prohibits a very 
wide range of activities that are listed under three headings: agreements and concerted practices 
that restrict competition; abuse of dominant position and monopolization; and mergers and 
acquisitions.10  In its letter, Competition Law applies to all sectors of the economy; that is, it 
applies to Turkish economy as a whole.  Competition Law is silent, however, with regard to public 
undertakings in that it does not contain a clause like Article 90 of Treaty of Rome, which explicitly 
brings public undertakings within the scope of competition law.11  Decision No. 1/95 of the 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed review of the legal aspects of Turkish Competition Law, see Öz (1999). 
10 What are called unfair competition practices, such as false advertising, deception, unfair practices, abuse 
of economic dependency and trademark, copyrights do not fall within the scope of Competition Law; they 
are subject to regulations of the Turkish Commercial Act instead. 
11 Article 90 was renumbered as Article 86 by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on October 2, 
1997 and entered into force on May 1, 1999.  The Treaty of Amsterdam amended certain provisions of the 
European Community Treaty (the Rome Treaty), the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and 
certain related acts. 
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Association Council on customs union explicitly requires that by the end of the first year after the 
customs union goes into effect, Turkey shall comply with the provisions of Article 90 of Rome 
Treaty.  Though it is observed that Competition Authority endevaoured to interpret public 
undertakings as falling within the scope of Turkish Competition Law, its efforts have been 
hindered by conflicts with other existing legislation regarding public undertakings.  As of this date, 
there has not been any amendments to Turkish Competition Law to clarify this issue. 
 
Restriction of competition through agreements and concerted practices 
The definitions given in Turkish Competition Law for practices that prevent, restrict or distort 
competition and the examples cited to clarify each type of practices are almost identical to Article 
85 of Euroepan Community Treaty.12  According to Article 4 of Turkish Competition Law, 
agreements and concerted practices among firms that aims to, directly or indirectly, prevent, distort 
or restrict competition in a certain market for goods and services are unlawful and prohibited.  
Tacit or explicit collusion through price fixing, limiting output, market sharing, market foreclosure, 
tying are a few examples from the list of activities prohibited by Article 4.  That is, both horizontal 
and vertical agreements are subject to scrutiny of Turkish Competition Law.  Although the list is 
not exhaustive, it is explicitly stated in Article 4 that all agreements that are likely to restrict 
competition and that are concluded to this end are prohibited.  In cases where the existence of an 
agreement cannot be proven, Turkish Competition Authority can take action against undertakings if 
price changes or supply and demand balance in the relevant market in which these undertakings 
operate exhibit features of markets where competition is prevented, distorted, or restricted (the 
concerted practice presumption).  In such cases the burden of proof lies with the undertakings 
concerned. 
 
                                                 
12 By the Treaty of Amsterdam Article 85 was renumbered as Article 81 (see Footnote 10). 
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Exempted agreements 
Article 5 lists types of horizontal and vertical agreements that are exempted from the application 
of Article 4.  These relate to agreements in which there is a presumption that economic efficiency 
will thereby be enhanced.  Vertical and horizontal agreements that improve production and 
distribution of goods or provision of services, that promote technological progress and innovation, 
in which consumers receive a fair share of the ensuing benefit, and that do not eliminate 
competition in a significant part of the relevant market, and that do not restrict competition more 
than what is necessary for achieving the said benefits, can be exempted from application of Article 
4 for a maximum of five years. 
The exemption may be an individual one or granted to certain categories of agreements.  So far 
Competition Authority has issued several block exemptions with regard to following type of 
vertical agreements: The Block Exemption Communiqué on the Exclusive Distribution Agreements 
No. 1997/3; The Block Exemption Communiqué on the Exclusive Purchasing Agreements No. 
1997/4; The Block Exemption Communiqué Regarding Distribution And Servicing Agreements In 
Relation To Motor Vehicles No. 1998/3; and The Block Exemption Communiqué Regarding 
Franchise Agreements No. 1998/7. 
At the time of their adoption these block exemptions were parallel to regulations adopted by 
EU.  At the end of 1999 EU Commission passed a new regulation, Commission Regulation (EC) 
No. 2790/1999, on the application of Article 81(3) (former Article 85(3)) of the EC Treaty to 
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices.  Regulation No. 2790/1999 replaced 
three former regulations, one on exclusive distribution, one on exclusive purchasing and one on 
franchise agreements.  Turkish Competition Authority is currently working on a new communiqué 
that will replace The Block Exemption Communiqué on the Exclusive Distribution Agreements No. 
1997/3, The Block Exemption Communiqué on the Exclusive Purchasing Agreements No. 1997/4, 
and The Block Exemption Communiqué Regarding Franchise Agreements No. 1998/7, and bring its 
regulations on these three issues in line with Regulation No. 2790/1999. 
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Currently Competition Authority is also working on several communiqués regarding technology 
transfer agreements, R&D agreements, and de minimis agreements. 
 
Abuse of dominant position 
Article 6 of Turkish Competition Law prohibits the abuse of dominant power in markets.  This 
provision is almost identical to Article 86 of EC Treaty.13  Article 6 defines dominant position as 
‘‘the power of one or more undertakings in a particular market to act independently of their 
competitors and customers, and to determine economic parameters such as price, supply, and the 
amount of production and distribution’’.  As such, Article 6 is immediately applicable to network 
industries that are currently undergoing privatization and/or extensive regulatory changes. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions 
Article 7 of Turkish Competition Law prohibits mergers and acquisitions that aim to create or 
strengthen a dominant position and result in inhibiting competition in the markets for goods and 
services.  Subsequently issued The Communiqué on Mergers and Acquisitions Calling for the 
Authorization of the Competition Board No. 1997/1, lists the types of mergers and acquisitions that 
require notification to Competition Authority and its authorization for validity. 
The Communiqué No. 1997/1 imposes two different groups of criteria.  Qualitative criterion 
identifies whether the type of transaction is a merger, acquisition or a joint venture.  Quantitative 
criterion determines the thresholds in terms of the total market share or total turnover of the 
resulting undertaking.  If the total market share of the resulting undertaking exceeds 25 percent of 
the relevant market, or the total turnover of the undertakings that take part in the action exceeds 25 
trillion TL, an authorization by Competition Authority must be obtained. 
                                                 
13 By the Treaty of Amsterdam Article 86 was renumbered as Article 82 (see Footnote 10). 
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The privatization cases also fall under Competition Authority’s jurisdiction.  Before an actual 
privatization transaction can take place, Competition Authority has to issue an authorization to the 
effect that privatization does not distort competition in the relevant market for goods and services. 
 
2.2. Turkish Competition Authority and Competition Board 
Competition Authority is the only administrative body responsible for implementing Turkish 
Competition Law.  Competition Authority comprises a Competition Board of 11 members, the 
Office of the Chairman, and the Service Department. 
Competition Board is the decision-making organ of Competition Authority.  The members of 
the Board are appointed by the Council of Ministers for a term of six years.  The Council of 
Ministers makes the appointments from among the candidates nominated by: the Ministry of Trade, 
the Ministry that oversees the Under-Secretariat of the State Planning Organization, the Court of 
Appeals, the Council of State, the Council of Higher Education, and the Turkish Union of 
Chambers and Exchanges. 
Competition Law grants full financial and administrative autonomy to Competition Authority 
(Article 20 of the Law).  That is, Competition Authority is an ‘‘independent administrative 
authority’’, and as such it is not subject to instructions and orders of any other governmental body, 
including the Council of Minister that appoints the members of Competition Board. 
Competition Board has been granted extensive powers of examination and investigation 
regarding issues that pertain to infringement of Competition Law.  It can act upon a notification or 
a complaint by any concerned party, by the request of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and upon 
its own initiative.  Competition Board also has the power to issue negative clearances to the effect 
that a particular transaction, if undertaken, will not violate the Competition Law.14 
Competition Authority has to be consulted regarding any changes in the legislation concerning 
competition policies (article 27 (g) of Competition Law).  To this end, a memorandum issued in 
                                                 
14 The Board reserves the right to revoke its negative clearance at any time it deems necessary. 
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1998 by the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Personnel and Principles instructed all 
ministries to receive the opinion of Competition Authority about draft laws, by-laws, regulations 
and communiqués regarding issues that fall under the scope of Competition Law.  However, 
compliance with this memorandum is wanting, as it has been observed that for various regulations 
the opinion of Competition Authority has either not been asked at all or asked at the last stage of 
regulations (for example, the Sugar Act and the Telecom Act, both enacted in 2001).  The said 
memorandum had to be reissued in 2001. 
Basic means that the Competiton Board is empowered with in implementing Competition Law 
are the authority to request information from related parties and on-the-spot examination (Articles 
14 and 15).  The Law also empowers the Board to levy fines (Articles 16 and 17).  Those who are 
specified by a Board decision to have committed behaviour prohibited in Articles 4 and 6 of 
Competition Law, and those who have failed to comply with regulations regarding filing of 
notification of written and oral statements (Article 11 sub-paragraph (b)) are liable to pay fines in 
the amount up to ten percent of the gross income that had been generated since the end of the 
previous financial year by real and legal entitites involved in the punishable undertaking.  In case 
legal entitites, undertakings, or associations of undertakings are punished with the foregoing fines, 
real persons in management bodies of these legal entities are also personally punishable with fines 
up to ten percent of those fines. 
Competition Board’s decisions can be appealed to the Council of State.  In case of an appeal, 
the fines do not become due until after the Board’s decision is upheld at the Council of State and 
becomes final. 
In addition to fines imposed by the Competiton Authority, Article 57 of Competition Law 
allows for those who suffered from the actions of violators to seek compensation in civil courts.  
Articles 58 of Competition Law explicitly stipulates that the judge may determine a compensation 
up to three times the net substantial damages suffered by the injured party.  Upon the request of a 
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party, the judge can apply the compensation principles of Competition Authority regardless of 
whether a case is brought before Competition Authority or not. 
 
3. Market Structure, Import Penetration, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Turkish Manufacturing Industries 
 
Before turning to the activities of Turkish Competition Authority, it will be useful to briefly 
summarize the evolution of the aspects of Turkish manufacturing industry relevant for our 
investigation starting from the 1980 reforms until as recently as available data allows. 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, revamping of the trade regime stood at the core of the 
reform process the Turkish economy has been undergoing since 1980.  Vigorously followed export 
promotion policies, as well as more gradually introduced import liberalization policies, had a 
profound impact on the manufacturing industry.  The State Institute of Statistics data reveal that the 
share of manufacturing in exports has gone up from 36% in 1980 to 79.1% in 1987 and stood at 
91.4% in 2000.  Studies available on the impact of trade liberalization on concentration of the 
manufacturing industries, however, suggest that highly concentrated structure of Turkish 
manufacturing industries have persisted throughout this period.15  This has important consequences 
regarding the implementation of competition laws and policies in Turkey.  Table 1 below tabulates 
CR4, the rate of market concentration as calculated by the shares of the 4 largest enterprises in total 
sales, in the manufacturing industry for the period 1980-1998.16  Table 1 also tabulates import 
penetration ratios, calculated as the ratio of imports to apparent consumption (domestic production 
plus imports minus exports), for the same industries over 1981-1998. 
                                                 
15 See Katırcıoğlu et al. (1995), Metin-Özcan et al. (2000), and Yalçın (2000).  We note that Forouton (1991), 
using private manufacturing data over the 1977-1985 period, found that import penetration led to a reduction 
in the gross profit margins. 
16 Appendix Table 1 at the end of the paper lists the manufacturing industry classification (ISIC Rev. 2) used 
in Table 1. 
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<INSERT TB 1 HERE> 
 
In addition to import penetration ratios, nominal protection rates are also important in judging 
the competitive pressures that an industry faces.  In the Additional Protocol to the Association 
Treaty signed in 1970, Turkish imports from the European Community were divided into two lists.  
There was a 12-year list for industrial products that Turkey was likely to reach international 
competitiveness relatively faster, and the rest of the manufactured goods were placed on a 22-year 
list.  With the customs union that went into effect in 1996 Turkey has reduced the nominal 
protection rates in trade with EU for all of the commodities in the 12- and 22- year lists.  For 
commodities that were not included in the 12- and 22-year lists but covered under the European 
Coal and Steel Community agreement, a separate Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1995 
between Turkey and EU, which stipulated that trade of commodities covered under the agreement 
would be gradually liberalized over a period of three years.  Thus, by 1999 the nominal protection 
rates for all industrial products when traded with EU have been reduced to zero.  It has been 
calculated that while the average nominal protection rates with EU had been calculated as 10.22% 
as of 1994, they have fallen on average to 1.34% by 1999.17  Moreover, the EU-Turkey customs 
union agreement requires Turkey to adopt the Customs Union Tariff of EU against third country 
imports by January 1, 1996, and all of the preferential agreements EU has concluded with third 
countries by the year 2001.18  Thus, by the year 2001 Turkey’s nominal protection rates for 
manufactured imports have been eliminated for EU and reduced substantially for third countries.   
                                                 
17 See Togan (1997). 
18 For certain products that fell under Common Customs Tariff of EU but deemed as ‘sensitive’ for Turkey, 
there was a grace period of up to five years for Turkey to adopt its tariffs against third countries.  This period 
has now expired. 
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An important aspect of Turkish imports that has a bearing on whether imports play a 
disciplining role for imperfectly competitive sectors is that the share of imports for production 
purposes has historically been higher than the share of imports for consumption purposes.  If 
imports of a certain product for production purposes dominate its imports for consumption 
purposes, the negative effect on average price-cost margins may be overwhelmed by the positive 
effect that imports for production purposes may have on price-cost margins.19  According to State 
Institute of Statistics data, the shares of investment goods, intermediate goods, and consumer goods 
in total imports in 1982 were 26.9%, 71.6%, and 2.1%, respectively.  The respective shares 
changed to 22.9%, 69.1%, and 8.0% in 1985; in 1989 they changed to 24.3%, 66.8%, and 8.7%, 
respectively; and in 2000 they were 20.9%, 65.8%, and 13.3%, respectively.  Table 2 below 
presents the share of imported intermediate goods utilized by manufacturing sectors. 
 
<INSERT TB 2 HERE> 
 
Table 3 provides data on inward FDI to Turkey for the 1980-2000 period, detailing total FDI 
realizations as well as the shares of manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and services in terms of 
amount of total FDI authorizations granted.  Table 3 reveals that total FDI inflows to Turkey have 
been rather modest.  This has bearing on the possible disciplining impact of entry of foreign firms 
into imperfectly competitive production sectors. 
 
<INSERT TB 3 HERE> 
 
                                                 
19 Katırcıoğlu et al. (1995) cite this as an explanation for why import penetration may have a positive effect 
on price-cost margins, an indicator of market power, which is suggested by some their findings. 
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4. The Enforcement of Competition Law in Turkey20 
Resources for the enforcement of Turkish Competition Law 
As of the end of year 2000, the number of staff at Competition Authority stood at 307.  Out of 
the total, 44 were economists, 33 were lawyers, 74 were classified as ‘‘other professionals’’, and 
166 were support personnel.  The relatively small share of specialists (economists and lawyers) and 
the relatively high share of support personnel among the staff is noticeable, and brings to mind the 
question of whether Competition Authority has enough administrative capacity to deal with the 
caseload it has faced.  Table 4 below displays the evolution of Competition Authority’s budgets 
since its inception in 1997. 
 
<INSERT TB 4 HERE> 
 
The caseload of Turkish Competition Authority 
Table 5 below presents data on the caseload handled by the Turkish Competition Authority 
during 1997-2000.  Some 1,254 petitions were filed during this period of time.  This is a substantial 
number of cases.  Of this total, 674 or 53.7% were regarding infringement of competition (Articles 
4 and 6), 250 or 19.9% were regarding mergers and acquisitons (Article 7), and 330 or 26.4% were 
applications for exemptions and negative clearance (Article 5).  The striking fact is that of these 
527 or 42% were found outside the scope of Competition Law.  In the early years after its adoption, 
misunderstandings regarding the scope of Competition Law, on the part of the industries involved 
                                                 
20 This section uses in part information provided in the Annual Reports filed by Competition Authority for 
OECD.  Except for the one for year 2000, these reports can be reached at the OECD official website 
(referenced in the References section of the paper).  While this study was under preparation we had access to 
a working draft of the annual report for the year 2000, kindly provided to us by the staff of Competition 
Authority.  The report has now been finalized and published. 
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as well as the general public, seem to have resulted in a considerable burden on the administrative 
capacity of Competition Authority.21 
 
<INSERT TB 5 HERE> 
 
Cases on infringement of competition 
According to Table 5, out of 285 petitions regarding infringement of competition that were 
found within the scope of the Law, only 95 were found worthy of investigation, while 137 petitions 
were refused consideration.  As of the end of year 2000, investigation was pending for 53 cases of 
infringement of competition. 
Of the 95 cases decided during 1997-2000 regarding infringement of competition, 35 involved 
Article 4 (on agreements and concerted actions that restrict competiton), 31 involved Article 6 (on 
abuse of dominant position), while 29 involved both Article 4 and Article 6.  Table 6 below 
displays the breakdown of infringement of competition cases heard according to the relevant article 
of Competition Law over the period 1997-2000. 
Table 6 reveals that Competition Authority made increasingly more decisions over the years.  
This reflects both the increases in number of applications over the years as well as a learning curve 
effect regarding decision making capacity of a newly founded agency.  Competition Authority 
posts the complete texts of its decisions on its official website (http://www.rekabet.gov.tr) after 
                                                 
21 According to Barros and Mata (1996), during 1984-93, the 10-year period following the adoption of a 
competition law in Portugal, only 55 investigations were launched.  Fingleton et al. (1996) note that during 
1992-95, the Czech competition office received 767 petitions, while the Hungarian competition authorities 
received 257, those in Poland received 535, and those in Slovakia received 512. 
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they are finalized (after the decision of the Council of State in case of an appeal), albeit with a 
delay.22 
 
<INSERT TB 6 HERE> 
 
Table 7 below provides the breakdown by sectors of petitions filed for the infringement of 
competition.  Food Products and Beverages (79); Transportation (63); Chemical Products (31), 
Petrochemicals, Petroleum Products, Fertilizers (31); Cement, Construction Equipment (29); 
Health, Education, Sport, and Self-Employment Activities (28) were the top 5 industries with the 
highest number of petitions regarding violations of competition. 
 
<INSERT TB 7 HERE> 
 
According to Table 1 market concentration in the food manufacturing sector (ISIC code 311) 
has remained relatively low over the years, with a CR4 of about 10%, while the concentration in 
the beverage industries (ISIC code 313) have been high, with a CR4 of about 40%.  Import 
penetration figures for food manufacturing and beverages industries have been around 10% and 
1%, respectively.  Transportation is a service industry that is subject to a myriad of regulations at 
both local and national level and thus susceptible to emergence of anti-competitive practices.  As 
Table 1 indicates, chemical products, petrochemicals, and petroleum products (ISIC codes 351-
354) involve industries that are among the most concentrated manufacturing industries in Turkey, 
                                                 
22 Decisions regarding infringement of competition can be viewed (in Turkish) at 
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/rekabetihlalleri.htm (November 18, 2001).  Out of 95 cases regarding infringement 
of competition that were decided during 1997-2000, there is information available for 71 cases.  In addition 
to complete texts for 48 decisions that have already been finalized, there is summary information regarding 
23 that are in the appeals court. 
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with CR4’s considerably above 50%.  These industries are characterized by large scale production 
units and by the presence of state-owned firms.  Import penetration is either low (around 5 % for 
353 and 354 products), or when high it is high (around 60% for 351 products) due to intermediate 
good nature of imports (Table 2).  Health, Education, Sport, and Self Emplyment Activites are 
outside the manufacturing industry.  As for the cement industry, the concentration ratio has 
typically been rather low.23  It can be argued that, judging from the concentration of production, 
one would not have expected excessive complaints of anti-competitive behavior from the consumer 
side in this sector.  On the other hand, cut-throat competition could also have led to complaints 
from rival firms. 
 
Fines imposed and collected 
Examination of publicly available decisions of Competition Authority reveals that Competition 
Authority has not shied away from using his power to levy fines regarding infringement of 
competiton cases.24  Out of 48 publicly available final decisions regarding infringement of 
competition for the period 1997-2000, a total of fines equivalent to about $6.94 millions were 
imposed in 12 cases.  The highest amount of fine levied in a single case was equivalent to about 
$2.14 millions.  One of the firms penalized in this case was subjected to a fine equivalent in 
amount to about $672,654, the highest amount levied against a single party during the period under 
                                                 
23 The ISIC Rev. 2 code that includes cement is 369.  Four-digit concentration ratios reported by State 
Institute of Statistics reveal that CR4 for cement industry (ISIC Rev 3 code 2694) was about 29% in 1998 
(see http://www.die http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/SONIST/IMALATYOG/90420011e.htm (November 
18, 2001).) 
24 See http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/rekabetihlalleri.htm (November 18, 2001).  The decisions are available only 
in Turkish. 
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concern.25  These are considerable amounts of fines to levy for any competition authority which is 
at the early stages of competition policy enforcement.26  However, in case of an appeal the fines 
imposed do not become due until after the decision of the Council of State.27  The appeal stage took 
as long as nearly 17 months in some cases.  Given the chronically high inflation rates in Turkey, 
this has eroded considerably the due amount of fines in real terms.28 
 
Cases on mergers and acquisitions 
Regarding mergers and acquisitions, Table 5 reveals that out of 115 petitions that were found 
within the scope of Competition Law, 103 were permitted, 10 were granted conditional permission, 
and only 2 were denied authorization.  Decisions regarding 16 out of 115 petitions found within the 
scope of the law were pending as of the end of year 2000.  These figures can be taken as an 
indication that Competition Authority have chosen to be rather lenient regarding mergers and 
acquisitons during initial years of competition law enforcement. 
Table 8 displays the distribution by sector and type of activity of applications regarding mergers 
and acquisitions.  Table 8 reveals that applications regarding mergers and acquisitions were spread 
over quite a few sectors.  The highest number of applications were made in chemical products, oil 
products, fertilizers sectors (31).  Five of these applications involved mergers, 17 involved 
acquisitions, 3 involved joint ventures, and 6 involved privatizations. 
                                                 
25 This was a case against a regional cement cartel.  The complete text (in Turkish) for the case can be found 
at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/99-30-276-166(a).doc (November 18, 2001). 
26 Hoekman and Djankov (1997) note that the maximum fine that could be imposed according to Bulgarian 
competition law for abuse dominant position was equivalent to $500. 
27 Article 55 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition. 
28 The average amount of erosion of fines for the 12 cases in which fines were imposed was about 50% in 
dollar terms. 
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<INSERT TB 8 HERE> 
 
Requests for exemptions and negative clearances 
As for petitions requesting exemptions and negative clearances, we observe from Table 5 that 
out of 311 cases found within the scope of Competition Law only 99 or 31.8% have been finalized 
so far, with decisions for 212 cases pending as of the end of year 2000.  Exemption was granted in 
17 cases investigated, and conditonal exemptions were granted for 27 cases.  Negative clearances 
were granted in 36 of the cases heard. 
Table 9 displays the distribution by sectors of applications for exemptions and negative 
clearance during 1997-2000.  The highest number of applications were made in the following 
industries: Land Vehicles, Aircraft, Sea Vessels, and Railway Carriers (55); Food Products and 
Beverages (51); Chemical Products, Petrochemicals, Petroleum Products, Fertilizers (41); Glass 
and Glass Products (38); and Electricity, Gas, Water (35).  The Land Vehicles, Aircraft, Sea 
Vessels, and Railway Carriers industries are very highly concentrated29.  While the Glass and Glass 
Products industry (ISIC code 362) has witnessed a steady decline of concentration since 1980, 
during which time import penetration ratios were steadily increasing, CR4 for the industry stood at 
40.6% in 1998.  Electricity, Gas, and Water are utility sectors.  As reported above , the number of 
exemption/negative clearance petitions decided by Competition Authority have been rather limited 
so far. 
 
<INSERT TB 9 HERE> 
                                                 
29 See the 4-digit concentration ratios reported by the State Institute of Statistics for ISIC rev. 3 codes 3530, 
3599, 3591, and 3520, which are all close to 100% 
http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/SONIST/IMALATYOG/90420011e.htm (November 18, 2001). 
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5. Selected Cases, Exemptions, and Special Regulatory Regimes 
We will now discuss some selected cases involving exclusions from the application of 
Competition Law in the case of public undertakings and in sectors that are subject to regulation. 
 
5.1. Public Entities 
Turkish Competition Law does not include an explicit provision on the issue of public 
undertakings. This is a crucial issue as state owned or state controlled enterprises still play a non-
negligible role in certain sectors of the Turkish economy, and they will continue to do so until the 
privatization and liberalization policies are effectively implemented. 
Though in its various communiqués Competition Authority has chosen to interpret the silence of 
the Law on this matter as being inclusive for the public undertakings and heard actions brought 
against state-owned enterprises and other public undertakings, its decisions reflect the ambiguity of 
Competition Law regarding this matter. 
 
The Union of Chambers and Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) Decision 
TOBB is an umbrella organization of chambers of commerce, industry, and maritime trade, as 
well as of various commodity exchanges in Turkey.  A special law, Law No. 5590, created TOBB 
in 1950.  Under Turkish Law, professional organizations are considered as ‘‘public legal’’ persons 
established to serve common needs of members of a profession.  A petition filed with Competition 
Authority claimed that additional letter of guarantee that TOBB required in issuing a certain kind 
of international transportation licence constituted discrimination and restricted competition.  In its 
decision regarding the case Competition Board qualified TOBB as an “association of undertaking” 
and ruled that the case fell under the scope of Competition Law.  However, Competition Board 
held that the licensing service referred to in the case was not part of TOBB’s essential duties listed 
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in Law No. 5590, but a duty it carried out on behalf of Turkish State which, under international 
law, is obligated to regulate international transport licensing. 
 
Turkish Sugar Factories Incorporated (TŞF A.Ş) Decision 
In a case brought against TŞF A.Ş., it was claimed that TŞF A.Ş, in violation of economic 
efficiency and profitability considerations, sold its output below cost, leading to financial distress 
for private sugar producers in the cities of Amasya, Konya and Kayseri.  It was claimed that pricing 
behavior of TŞF A.Ş. pushed the private producers out of the market, and as such constituted abuse 
of dominant position and violated the Competition Law.  Competition Board found that TŞF A.Ş 
was indeed in dominant position in the relevant market as defined in Article 3 of Competition Law.  
However, claims of violation of Article 6 were refused owing to the reason that TŞF A.Ş did not 
determine freely its activities in the relevant market and, in particular, due to the reason that sales 
and procurement prices of sugar-beet and sales price of sugar were determined by Prime Ministry 
and relevant ministries on the basis of laws and by-laws and taking public interest into account. 
 
5.2. Privatization 
Most privatization transactions fall under article 7 of Competition Law (Mergers and 
Acquisitions) and related communiqués issued by Competition Board (the Communiqué 
Concerning Mergers and Acquisitions that Require Authorization by the Competition Board - 
Communiqué No: 1997/1).  It was later understood that the said communiqué did not cover 
adequately all privatization transactions, and an additional commumniqué was issued that required 
approval by Competition Board before tender transactions (Communiqué Regarding the Methods 
and Principles to be Pursued During the Course of Pre-Notifications and Applications for 
Authorization Made to the Competition Authority in order that Acquisitions via Privatization to be 
Judicially Valid - Communiqué No. 1998/4).  Later an amendment was made to this Communiqué 
by the Communiqué numbered 1998/5, and transfers to be made by public institutions and 
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organizations other than Privatization Administration were also covered by the Communiqué.  The 
said communiqué and its amendment regarding pre-notification and pre-approval by Competition 
Board of privatization transactions aimed at preventing possible anti-competitive consequences of 
privatization decisions before they come into effect.  It can be argued that with the said regulations, 
at least on paper, Competition Authority has a central role in the privatization process, and thus 
likely anti-competitve effects of privatization can be mitigated. 
 
The POAŞ Case 
The privatization process of Petroleum Office Inc. (POAŞ) serves as an example to illuminate 
the curious role Competition Authority has played in privatizations.  The privatization of POAŞ, 
which is a public oil distribution company, was initiated before Competition Authority was 
empowered through The Communiqué No. 1998/4 to authorize privatization transactions.  In 1998, 
Privatization Administration asked Competition Authority to evaluate the validity of 3 offers that 
were received at the time.  At the same time, the Privatization High Council gave POAŞ to one of 
the three bidders, and Competition Authority was informed about the decision.  Competition Board 
gave a conditional authorization for the transaction.  An appeal to the Administrative Court against 
the decision of the Privatization High Council resulted in the cancellation of the POAŞ decision.  In 
1999 the privatization process started anew.  Upon examining the applications of four separate joint 
venture firms Competition Board has concluded that the sale of POAŞ to any of the groups would 
not create a new or strengthen an existing dominant position. 
 
 
The İGSAŞ Case 
In the case of Toros Fertilizer acquisition of publicly owned İstanbul Fertilizer Industry 
(İGSAŞ), Inc, Competition Board did not grant authorization for the acquisition on the grounds that 
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Toros Fertilizer would gain a dominant position in the nitrogenous fertilizers market and as this 
would lessen competition substantially. 
 
5.3. Banking Industry 
In addition to various new regulations regarding the sector, a new independent regulatory 
agency, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), has been established to regulate 
and supervise the banking sector.  BRSA also has the authority to transfer banks in difficulty to 
Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF).  The SDIF in turn has the authority to transfer banks in 
difficulty to other banks, or to a new bank to be established, or merge them with another bank.  A 
special provision stipulated that if the market share in terms of total assets of banks to be 
transferred or merged did not exceed 20 percent, articles 7, 10, and 11 of Competition Law would 
not apply. This seriously limits the power of Competition Board with regard to mergers and 
transfers carried out by the SDIF.  After the new economic program adopted in May 2001 under 
the auspices of IMF, an amendment to the Banking Act on May 5, 2001 extended the said 
provision to all mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector.  This amendment de facto puts 
mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector out of scope of Competition Law. 
 
5.4. Printing and Publishing Industry 
BİRYAY, BDD, YAYSAT Case 
YAYSAT and BBD, which were almost entirely dominant in the distribution of Turkish 
newspapers and journals at the time of the complaint (1998), had set up a joint company, BİRYAY, 
which led to a complete monopolization of the relevant market.  They failed to notify the 
agreement to the Competition Authority, and upon a complaint from the industry the Competition 
Board started an investigation in April 1999.  The case involved the most extensive violations in 
the form of restricting competition via agreements and abuse of dominant position.  In its decision 
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the Competition Board found all three companies in violation of Articles 4 and 6 of the 
Competition Law and imposed heavy fines.30 
 
5.5. Telecommunications Industry 
The Telecommunications Act No. 4502 of January 27, 2000, establihed a new independent 
regulatory agency, Telecommunications Authority, to regulate the industry.  Act No. 4502 was 
later revised by Telecommunications Act No. 4673, passed on May 23, 2001.  Though the 
independent Telecommunication Authority has far-reaching powers in regulating the industry, 
including the authority to regulate prices, authorization of licences to operate in the 
telecommunications industry will continue to be issued by Ministry of Transportation. 
With different agencies having regulatory power over the telecommunications sector, it remains 
to be seen how competition rules will be implemented in the telecommunications sector.  In 
particular, it is not clear whether the Telecommunications Authority has the right to perform 
investigations similar to those undertaken by Competition Authority regarding anti-competitive 
behavior in the industry. 
 
 
 
Turkcell Investigation 
Altough Competition Authority had ruled against a petition that claimed collusive behavior on 
the part of the cellular phone service duopoly in 1999, on January 13, 2000 it initiated an 
investigation against Turkcell Communication Services, Inc., one of the service providers whose 
                                                 
30 The total fines imposed on three companies amounted to about USD 2.5 million at the time of the decision 
(December 14, 2000) by the Competition Board.  This amount was worth about USD 1.4 million when the 
decision was finalized after the appeal process (April 15, 2001). 
    
 25 
number now increased to three, on the grounds that Turkcell had been abusing its dominant 
position.  This investigation has recently been finalized and Competition Board found Turkcell 
guilty of abusing its dominant position.  Pending an appeal, the decision imposed a penalty of 7 
trillion TL, which is slightly below 1 percent of Turkcell’s gross revenues generated in 1999.31 
 
Turk Telekom Investigation 
Another investigation, which is currently undergoing, concerns Turk Telekom, the former state 
monopoly in the telecommunications industry that will retain its legal monopoly rights over basic 
services for national and international voice telephony provided over the fixed telecommunications 
network until December 31, 2003.  Turkish Telecom is accused of abusing its dominant position in 
relation to firms providing Internet services over the fixed network that it controls. 
 
5.6. Electricity and Natural Gas Industries 
Two recent acts (the Electricity Market Act and the Gas Market Act, both enacted in 2001) 
created an independent Energy Authority to regulate and oversee electricity and natural gas 
markets that are to be deregulated, liberalized, and privatized.  As in the telecommunications 
sector, the jurisdiction of Competition Authority and Energy Authority seems to overlap.  
Competition Authority was consulted during preparation of the acts that aim at restructuring the 
energy markets.  The powers of Competition Authority regarding anti-competitive behavior in 
these markets are retained, at least in the letter of these acts. 
 
                                                 
31 The case is appealed to the Council of State.  The decision was announced to the public, but since Turkcell 
appealed the to the Council of State, the text of the Competition Board’s decision has not been made publicly 
available.  Information on the case was compiled form national newspapers and interviews with the staff of 
Competition Authority. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Empirical assessments of enforcement of anti-trust legislation in countries that have adopted 
competition legislation relatively recently, mostly the former centrally planned economies that are 
in transition to a market economy, have concluded that most enforcement cases concern abuse of 
dominance and most of these involved allegation of unfair trade practices and were basically 
contract enforcement problems.  The issue of hard-core cartels were almost never addressed.  
Moreover, it was concluded that remedies for flagrant violations of competition laws were not 
sufficiently prohibitive to ensure that firms had a strong enough incentive to abide by the law.32 
Enforcement of Turkish Competition Law seems to have fared relatively better on these 
grounds, at least based on the available evidence for the short period of time that has passed since 
its inception.  Unfair trade practices are outside the scope of Turkish Competition Law.  Some of 
the investigations carried out by Competition Authority involved collusive practices, and the 
amount of fines that were imposed in certain cases can certainly be classified as prohibitive.  This 
having been said, however, there certainly is much room for improvement. 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, the adoption and implementation of a competition 
policy is an obligation that Turkey has undertaken in its Customs Union Agreement with EU.  As 
far as Turkey is concerned, it is a fact that the customs union with EU is primarily seen as a 
stepping-stone for full membership.  Thus the pace with which obligations under the Customs 
Union Agreement are carried out reflects to a considerable extent the progress made on the 
membership front.  The delay between the enactment of Competition Law in 1994 and the 
establishment and the starting of operations of Competition Authority at the end of 1997 can be 
viewed as an indication of this dependence. 
                                                 
32 Fingleton et al. (1996). See Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) for another empirical assessment of competition 
policy implementation in transition economies. 
    
 27 
One consequence of the impact of EU on Turkish Competition Law is that it is largely 
compatible with the competition policies and rules of EU.  There are, however, some exceptions, 
such as the silence of Turkish Competition Law on the extremely important issue of public 
undertakings.  The evidence regarding application of the Law on public undertakings can be 
described at best as mixed.  Many public undertakings are shielded from the application of 
Competition Law by special legislation.  Moreover, liberalization, privatization, and regulation in a 
number of very important sectors, including the network industries such as telecommunications and 
electricity industries, are yet to be accomplished.  The impact of Competition Law on the evolution 
of this process has certainly been less than satisfactory, and the role of Competition Authority less 
than clearly defined. 
Turkey's obligation under the Customs Union Agreement with EU concerns not only the 
adoption of a competition law that is compatible with that of EU, but also its effective enforcement.  
Though adopting a competition law and and establishing a competition authority are important in 
and of themselves, they only constitute a first, and typically a non-controversial, step towards its 
enforcement.  Full enforcement of Turkish Competition Law will be a much more controversial 
issue.  Turkish Competition Law has not grown from domestic roots but it has been a response to 
outside pressures. This very fact reflects upon the pace with which it is being internalized and 
becomes a way of doing business in the Turkish industry.  In an economy where a long history of 
state intervention has created many vested interests, favored players, and a culture of doing 
business that is largely based on soliciting special treatment from the central government, it will be 
difficult to establish that a competiton law exists, and that it will be applied to all economic agents, 
including the state itself, without any exception. 
The way Turkish Competition Authority has been established and empowered is quite 
satisfactory on paper.  It is construed as an independent agency with full financial and 
administrative autonomy.  Autonomous administrative bodies are a novelty in the Turkish public 
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administration structure and whether they are indeed compatible with the overall structure as well 
as the Turkish legal system is subject to debate.33 
Competition Authority is by law endowed with its own sufficient financial resources and enjoys 
complete autonomy regarding personnel decisions.  As already referred to, Competition Board is 
the sole decision-making unit of Competition Authority and its members are appointed by the 
Council of Ministers from among candidates chosen by a number of public bodies.  The members 
are appointed for renewable terms of six years, which is thought to shield the members from 
political influence.  Whether a Board like this will in fact be independent of political influence 
depends critically on whether its members are appointed on the basis of merit or political 
affiliation.  Since the Board enjoys complete independence in its decisions and actions, the 
composition of the Board becomes a crucial factor.  The evidence on Turkey's experience with 
appointments of this sort is at best mixed.  The recent contoversy during the Summer of 2001 
regarding appointment of members for a similarly independent Telecommunications Board is an 
example of how the composition of such boards incites political haggling instead of search for most 
meritorious regulators. 
So far, Competition Authority has built a respectable group of staff to work on the cases that fall 
under its jurisdiction.  But as the caseload is likely to increase very fast very soon, more staff will 
definetely be needed.  The composition of the staff currently employed raises some corcern 
regarding whether enough specialists are being employed. 
A review of the cases opened and decided by Competition Authority during its first three years 
leaves the impression that it has been rather cautious in enforcing Competition Law.  This is 
especially the case in terms of authorizations for mergers and acquisitions.  This is perhaps prudent, 
since the implementation of such a wide ranging law, which involves enforcing behavior that is 
radically different from the way economic actors had been used to behave, requires time and 
patience.  It can be argued that Competition Authority has needed this time to form its organization 
                                                 
33 See Tan (2000). 
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and develop its staff base in order to be better placed to tackle cases of greater magnitude and 
importance. 
An important factor that impedes effective enforcement of Competition Law is the fact that in 
case of an appeal the fines imposed do not become due until after the decision of the Council of 
State.  Since the appeal stage can take a very long time, in many cases the fines imposed have been 
eroded considerably in the chronically high inflationary environment in Turkey.  This is a serious 
drawback of the Turkish Competition Law and would definitely need to be reconsidered in an 
amendment of the Law. 
A competition authority needs institutional courage and political backing to take hard actions 
against serious anti-competitive behavior by "big" players in the industry.  There have been several 
cases so far where Turkish Competition Authority acted vigorously against not so small firms. 
However, there have not been enough cases so far to judge how the Turkish Competition 
Authority's vast powers on paper will reflect on competition law enforcement in cases that involve 
serious infringements by powerful firms. 
The performance of the Turkish Competition Authority during the relatively short period of 
time since its inception in 1998 has definitely been promising.  That a lot remains to be done 
regarding its organizational development and maturity is of course evident, given its short history 
and the difficulty of the task it has undertaken. 
It has to be also noted that the period during which Competition Authority has been operative, 
namely since 1998, Turkish economy has been going through almost a continuous crisis situation.  
Both the South East Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998 adversely affected the 
Turkish economy.  In 1999 the country lived through two major earthquakes that devastated several 
industrial provinces around Istanbul.  At the end of 1999 government signed a stand-by agreement 
with the IMF and started a major anti-inflationary program that also involved various stuctural 
reforms.  The year 2000 saw gradual worsening of current account deficits, delays in implementing 
the structural reforms, a banking crisis in Fall, and finally the peg on the Turkish Lira had to be 
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abandoned when the crisis worsened in February 2001.  Such severe macroeconomic imbalances 
do not constitute a favorable background for implementing and enforcing a newly enacted 
competition policy.  A more active competition policy enforcement would have probably caused 
further disturbances or not be credibly implemented, and in either case the credibility of both 
Competition Law and Competition Authority would have been jeopardized. 
Turkey’s (admittedly limited) experience with enforcement of competition policy confirms the 
experiences in other countries in that one needs to have competition already instituted in the 
economy for a competition authority to do its work properly.  In Turkey this has been evident in the 
cases of privatization and instituting regulatory frameworks in a number of formerly natural 
monopoly industries.  Competition laws are more easily applied and more effective in protecting 
competition that is already instituted in industries and not for instituting competition itself.  More 
generally, one needs a solid institutional framework comprising rule of law, a well-functioning 
legal system, respect for well-defined property rights, and so on, that will support a well-
functioning market economy before competition policies can be expected to live up to their 
promise. 
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Table 1: 4-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4) and Import Penetration (IP) for 3-digit ISIC 
Manufacturing Sectors in Turkey, 1980-1998 (%) 
 
CR4 < 30% (as of 1980) 
 1980 1981-1988 1989-1993 1994-1997 1998 
Sectors CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP 
311 10.2 N/A 11.6 6.7 13.0 9.0 14.4 14.0 9.77  10.2 
312 22.1 N/A 23.3  18.7  18.2  21.9  
321 12.7 N/A 9.2 4.7 8.5 9.5 7.5 21.2 4.7 25.3 
322 21.3 N/A 19.2 1.1 5.6 1.4 6.0 4.2 6.5 6.0 
323 21.6 N/A 18.3 12.5 27.0 39.4 24.1 40.5 21.7 32.4 
331 19.9 N/A 17.1 4.8 20.5 4.7 30.6 10.7 32.5 16.0 
352 21.2 N/A 22.6 13.6 22.7 17.9 20.4 24.5 19.3 28.8 
356 25.4 N/A 21.0 3.9 20.4 11.2 20.0 15.2 16.3 18.3 
369 17.0 N/A 18.5 5.2 19.5 5.6 19.5 6.4 16.6 6.2 
381 16.3 N/A 14.9 26.8 18.8 36.7 16.7 44.8 11.5 45.2 
383 15.0 N/A 24.9 33.6 29.7 34.4 24.4 0.48 30.2 57.7 
 
30% ≤  CR4 < 50% (as of 1980) 
 1980 1981-1988 1989-1993 1994-1997 1998 
 CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP 
314 46.4 N/A 64.9 5.3 59.6 12.1 64.5 11.3 58.9 13.0 
332 37.5 N/A 47.4 7.3 44.9 8.8 40.6 17.5 43.9 18.7 
341 47.4 N/A 37.0 12.0 25.6 21.5 22.6 32.8 17.7 38.6 
342 36.5 N/A 38.4 3.0 50.1 4.6 60.0 5.5 40.2 4.8 
372 47.2 N/A 49.0 21.0 46.8 26.2 45.4 39.3 36.1 40.1 
382 33.4 N/A 38.0 51.2 44.8 51.1 42.2 61.7 34.3 65.6 
384 35.8 N/A 35.7 29.8 47.8 27.6 41.0 39.9 37.3 39.3 
385 32.2 N/A 34.7 86.9 45.1 72.2 56.8 69.8 55.7 73.2 
390 42.3 N/A 37.9 21.2 29.3 45.2 29.2 66.8 24.0 63.0 
 
50% ≤  CR4 (as of 1980) 
 1980 1981-1988 1989-1993 1994-1997 1998 
 CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP CR4 IP 
313 55.8 N/A 45.4 0.8 33.0 0.7 34.6 1.5 38.6 0.8 
324 63.1 N/A 49.3 3.1 37.1 11.2 36.5 28.7 36.6 32.1 
351 49.2 N/A 41 40.4 49.9 47.3 57.4 58.8 48.9 62.1 
353 100 N/A 99.2 3.0 98.1 4.3 98.3 5.0 97.8 4.3 
354 54.7 N/A 68.9 1.7 74.6 2.4 63.4 7.4 60.1 7.7 
355 71.5 N/A 70.7 6.5 71.5 14.4 74.8 17.8 72.6 20.8 
361 79.6 N/A 62.0 1.6 58.8 3.3 59.4 4.9 58.0 5.4 
362 72.1 N/A 61 4.7 51.9 10.1 56.9 17.6 40.6 18.9 
371 54.8 N/A 43.5 18.8 35.7 22.5 31.5 26.7 34.7 26.7 
Source: CR4 data for periods 1980, 1981-1988,1989-1993, 1993-1997 are taken from Metin-Özcan et.al. (2000); 1998 
data is obtained from SIS.  Import penetration measures are calculated using The World Bank Trade and Production 
Database.  < http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/tradeandproduction.html> (November 18, 2001).
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Table 2: Percentage of intermediates utilized by sector Y that are imported 
 
Sector Y  
311/312 15,5 
353/354 76,3 
313/314 10,0 
312 22,5 
322 32,6 
323 12,1 
331/332 9,2 
341/342 34,6 
351/352/ 355/359 36,8 
361/362/369 20,5 
371 48,3 
372 14,7 
381 18,9 
384 18,2 
382 32,1 
383/385 25,5 
390 48,5 
Total Intermediate 21,9 
Source: The World Bank Trade and Production Database.  
<http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/tradeandproduction.html> (November 18, 2001.) 
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Table 3: FDI Inflows to Turkey And Share of Sectors in Authorized FDI 
 
YEARS 
Total 
Realizations 
(million US $) 
MANUFACT. 
(%) 
AGRICUL. 
(%) 
MINING 
(%) 
SERVICES 
(%) 
1980 35 91,5 0,0 0,0 8,5 
1981 141 73,0 0,3 0,3 26,4 
1982 103 59,0 0,6 1,2 39,2 
1983 87 86,6 0,0 0,0 13,4 
1984 162 68,5 2,2 0,1 29,2 
1985 158 60,9 2,7 1,8 34,5 
1986 170 53,2 4,6 0,2 42,0 
1987 239 44,9 2,0 0,2 53,0 
1988 488 59,8 3,3 0,7 36,2 
1989 855 62,8 0,6 0,8 35,8 
1990 1.005 65,2 3,5 2,5 28,7 
1991 1.041 55,7 1,1 2,0 41,2 
1992 1.242 70,0 1,8 1,0 27,1 
1993 1.016 76,0 1,0 0,6 22,4 
1994 830 74,9 1,9 0,4 22,7 
1995 1.127 67,9 1,1 2,1 28,9 
1996 964 16,7 1,7 0,2 81,5 
1997 1.032 51,9 0,7 1,6 45,7 
1998 976 61,8 0,3 0,8 37,0 
1999 817 66,1 1,0 0,4 32,5 
2000 1.719 36,4 2,0 0,2 61,4 
TOTAL 16.119 55,2 1,6 0,9 42,2 
Source: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry.  
<http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/ead/SEKTOR/SEKTOR.HTM> (November 18, 2001.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Trends in Competition Policy Resources in Turkey (1997-2000) 
 
Years Person-year Budget (TL) Budget (US $) 
2000 307 12,859,000,000 21,210,280 
1999 297 21,000,000,000 49,000,000 
1998 259 9,800,000,000 37,600,000 
1997*  2,700,000,000  
* Competition Authority commenced its operations on November 5, 1997. 
Source: Turkish Competition Authority. Annual Reports on Competition Policy Developments in Turkey, 
1998-2000. 
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Table 5: The Caseload of Turkish Competition Authority 
 
Applications for the Infringement of Competition 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL 
 Applications  22 177 220 255 674 
Decided upon investigation 5 5 32 53 95 
Applications refused 1 36 38 62 137 
Applications that were found outside the 
scope of the Law 
3 3 236 147 389 Decisions Finalized 
Total 9 44 306 262 621 
 
Applications for Mergers and Acquisitions 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL 
 Applications  8 59 80 103 250 
Permitted 1 25 31 46 103 
Conditional permission - 6 1 3 10 
Not permitted - - 1 1 2 
Applications that are not within the scope 
of the Law  
4 21 43 51 119 
Decisions Finalized 
Total 5 52 76 101 234 
 
Applications for Exemptions and Negative Clearance 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL 
 Applications  - 245 44 41 330 
Exempted - 1 11 5 17 
Issued negative clearence - 11 17 8 36 
Conditional exemptions - - 21 6 27 
Applications that are not within the scope 
of the Law  
- - 15 4 19 
Decisions Finalized 
Total - 12 64 23 99 
Source: Second Annual Report, 2000, Competition Authority. 
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Table 6: Breakdown of Cases Decided Regarding Infringement of Competiton According to 
Relevant Article of the Law (1997-2000) 
 
Years Article 4 Article 6 Article 4 & 6 TOTAL 
1997 2 3 - 5 
1998 3 2 - 5 
1999 9 10 13 32 
2000 21 16 16 53 
TOTAL 35 31 29 95 
Source: Second Annual Report, 2000, Competition Authority. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Distribution by Sectors of Applications for the Infringements of Competition 
 
SECTOR 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL 
Printing and Publishing, Reproduction of 
Records, Cassettes and Similar Media  
10 12 10 32 
Food Products and Beverages 19 25 35 79 
Land Vehicles, Aircraft, Sea Vessels and 
Railway Carriers 
1 9 2 12 
Transportation 19 26 18 63 
Electricity/Electronics 1 1 2 4 
Financial Services 4 7 7 18 
Electricity/Gas/Water  3 5 3 11 
Agricultural and Livestock Breeding, Forest 
Products 
8 3 3 14 
Cement, Construction Equipment  17 6 6 29 
Office Equipment and Computer 3 4 2 9 
Chemical Products, Petrochemicals, Petroleum 
Products, Fertilizers 
8 11 12 31 
Medical Instruments, Optical Instruments 1 1 1 3 
Mine and Mining 2 4 3 9 
Health, Education, Sport, and Self-
Employment Activities  
17 11 0 28 
Telecommunications 2 4 2 8 
Tobacco Products 0 1 0 1 
Glass 1 0 0 1 
Iron and Steel 1 0 0 1 
Tourism 0 1 1 2 
Textiles and Ready Made Clothes 0 2 1 3 
Furniture, White Goods, Toys, Sports 
Equipment, Musical Instruments, Jewelery 
0 0 1 1 
Plastic and Rubber Products 0 1 0 1 
Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 0 3 2 5 
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 0 0 1 1 
Others 3 4 3 10 
 Total 120 141 115 376 
Source: Second Annual Report, 2000, Competition Authority; and Competition Policy in OECD Countries: Annual 
Report filed by Turkey http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/ANNUAL_reports/1998-99.htm (November 18, 2001.) 
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Table 8: Distribution by Sector and Type of Activity of Applications Regarding Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
 
MERGERS 
 
ACQUISITION JOINT  
VENTURE 
PRIVATIZATION TOTAL SECTORS 
98 99 00 98 99 00 98 99 00 98 99 00 98 99 00 
Printing and Publishing, 
Reproduction of Records, 
Cassettes and Similar 
Media 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Agricultural and 
Livestock Breeding, 
Forest Product, Water 
Products 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Chemical products, oil 
products, fertilizers 
0 1 4 4 2 11 1 2 0 2 2 2 7 7 17 
Electricity, gas, water 1 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 0 4 
Construction, cement and 
other construction 
materials 
1 0 0 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 1 
Iron-Steel 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 
Office equipment and 
computer 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Food and beverages 1 0 0 7 5 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 10 5 7 
Textile and ready-made 
clothing 
0 0 0 3 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 4 1 
Machinery and 
equipment manufacturing 
0 1 0 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 2 
Financial services 
(banking, insurance etc.) 
1 0 1 4 4 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 7 5 2 
Land vehicles, aircraft, 
sea vessels and railway 
carriers 
1 0 0 2 2 5 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 3 6 
Telecommunications 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Metals other than iron 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Glass and glass products 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Paper and paper products 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 
Tobacco Products 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Fired Clay and Ceramics 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Medical and Optic 
Equipment 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Furniture, White Good, 
Jewellery 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Transportation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
TOTAL 5 3 5 43 22 37 6 6 3 9 1 5 63 32 250 
Source: Second Annual Report, 2000, Competition Authority; and Competition Policy in OECD Countries: Annual 
Report filed by Turkey http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/ANNUAL_reports/1998-99.htm (November 18, 2001.) 
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Table 9: The Distibution by Sectors of Applications for Exemption and Negative Clearance 
 
SECTOR 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL 
Printing and Publishing, Reproduction of 
Records, Cassettes and Similar Media  
6 5 4 15 
Food Products and Beverages  30 18 3 51 
Land Vehicles, Aircraft, Sea Vessels and 
Railway Carriers 
39 10 6 55 
Transportation 4 1 0 5 
Electricity/Electronics 6 1 0 7 
Financial Services 2 2 1 5 
Electricity/Gas/Water  33 1 1 35 
Agricultural and Livestock Breeding, Forest 1 0 0 1 
Cement, Construction Equipment  7 3 1 11 
Office Equipment and Computer 0 0 0 0 
Chemical Products, Petrochemicals, Petroleum 
Products, Fertilizers 
38 2 1 41 
Optical Instruments 0 0 0 0 
Mine and Mining 0 0 0 0 
Health, Education, Sport, and Self-
Employment Activities  
0 1 0 1 
Telecommunications 0 0 1 1 
Tobacco Products 0 0 0 0 
Glass and Glass Products  34 4 0 38 
Iron and Steel 0 0 0 0 
Tourism 0 0 0 0 
Textiles and Ready Made Clothes  4 6 0 10 
Plastic and Rubber Products  2 1 0 3 
Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  2 4 3 9 
Fairs 0 0 0 0 
White Goods 6 3 0 9 
Cellulose, Paper and Paper Products 3 3 2 8 
Fired Clay and Ceramics 0 1 0 1 
Jewellery 1 0 0 1 
Toys 1 0 0 1 
Others 1 0 0 1 
Total 220 66 23 309 
Source: Second Annual Report, 2000, Competition Authority; and Competition Policy in OECD Countries: Annual 
Report filed by Turkey http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/ANNUAL_reports/1998-99.htm (November 18, 2001.)
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Appendix Table 1: Manufacturing Industry Classification According to International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
 
311 Food manufacturing 
312 Manufacture of food products not elsewhere classified 
313 Beverage industries 
314 Tobacco manufactures 
321 Manufacture of textiles 
322 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear 
323 Manufacture of leather and products of leather, leather substitutes and fur, except footwear 
and wearing apparel 
324 Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanize or moulded rubber of plastic footwear 
331 Manufacture of wood and wood cork products, except furniture 
332 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal 
341 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
342 Printing, publishing and allied industries 
351 Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals 
352 Manufacture of other chemical products 
353 Petroleum refineries 
354 Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 
355 Manufacture of rubber products 
356 Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere classified 
361 Manufacture of pottery, china, and earthenware 
362 Manufacture of glass and glass products 
369 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
371 Iron and steel basic industries 
372 No-ferrous metal basic industries 
381 Manufacture of fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment 
382 Manufacture of machinery (except electrical) 
383 Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus, repairing, appliances and supplies 
384 Manufacture of transport equipment 
385 Manufacture of professional, scientific measuring and photographic and optical goods 
390 Other manufacturing industries 
 
